In its most recent intelligence assessment, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that Russia’s defense industry is pursuing a long-term effort to expand T-90 tank production and reestablish its pre-war tank reserves, signaling intent to maintain a sustained military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Internal documents published on October 11 by Frontelligence Insight, an open-source intelligence group based in Ukraine, show that Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, has outlined plans to increase T-90 production by 80 percent by 2028 compared to 2024 levels, while also initiating production of a new variant called the T-90M2, also referred to as Project 188MS or Ryvok-1.
The internal documents indicate that Uralvagonzavod expects to produce 10 T-90M2 tanks in 2026 and gradually scale up output to a peak of 428 combined T-90M and T-90M2 tanks in 2028. Between 2027 and 2029, the company plans to manufacture a total of 1,118 new and modernized T-90M and T-90M2 units.
These targets represent a significant increase over Russia’s known annual production rates. Ukrainian officials have previously estimated that the manufacturer can produce approximately 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under ideal conditions, and current estimates suggest monthly production ranges between three and six tanks.
A Russian military blogger claimed in July that the factory has produced between 540 and 630 T-90M tanks since February 24, 2022, which would represent an average of 13 to 15 tanks per month. To meet these new output goals, Russia’s defense industry will likely need to expand its manufacturing capacity through the use of automation and high-precision machine tools.
These upgrades are necessary due to labor shortages and the ongoing military personnel losses in Ukraine. In March 2025, Uralvagonzavod launched a training program for computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators to support its production goals. Despite Western sanctions, Russia continues to acquire high-precision equipment from abroad.
According to Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate, Uralvagonzavod is producing tank engines using European-manufactured CNC machines obtained through sanctions evasion schemes. The production targets outlined in the leaked documents are aspirational and may not be met, but the planning demonstrates that Russia is committed to rearming and is preparing for military scenarios beyond the current war in Ukraine.
Frontelligence assessed that Russia aims to modernize its armored forces with more than 2,000 T-90M, T-90M2, and T-72B3M tanks between 2026 and 2036. When combined with the tanks and armored vehicles already produced in 2024 and 2025, this output would be sufficient to fully restore Russia’s tank fleet to pre-war levels in preparation for another large-scale conflict.
Open-source data suggests that Russia is also expanding its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, either for near-term use in Ukraine or to rebuild its strategic reserve for future operations against NATO. A source tracking Russian military storage sites using satellite imagery reported that Russia’s overall tank reserve declined from 3,106 to 2,478 between June and October 2025.
The number of T-72A tanks in storage reportedly dropped from 900 to 461 during the same period. The data also suggests that Russia is withdrawing T-72A tanks from previously untouched depots for refurbishment and that the defense industrial base is dismantling remaining T-64 tanks to use as parts.
Estimates based on storage inventories indicate that Russia’s remaining reserves include approximately 141 T-54/55 tanks, 885 T-62 tanks, 611 T-64 tanks, 492 T-72A tanks, 287 T-72B tanks, 44 T-80B tanks, 82 T-80U tanks, and zero T-90 tanks. This breakdown aligns with observed patterns of refurbishment and depletion.
ISW continues to observe reduced use of tanks by Russian forces in active combat compared to the heavy deployment of armored vehicles in 2023 and 2024. Russia appears to be conserving its remaining tanks while shifting to increased use of lighter armored vehicles and infantry-supported attacks.
At the same time, refurbished tanks are likely being reserved for selective use in ongoing operations and possible deployment in other scenarios. The shift away from high-volume armored assaults may be driven in part by Ukrainian drone effectiveness, which has resulted in significant damage to Russian armor.
Russia still employs tanks during occasional mechanized assaults when Ukrainian drone capabilities are degraded. Recently, Russian forces conducted both company-sized and reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assaults in areas near Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Dobropillya in Donetsk Oblast.
These operations followed a period of relative inactivity involving large armored formations. The assaults appear to be timed to coincide with adverse weather, including rain and high wind, which limit the effectiveness of Ukrainian drones. This suggests that Russian forces are using weather as a tactical advantage to shield mechanized advances.
The ongoing refurbishment of T-72A tanks suggests that Russia will be able to replenish frontline units in key areas and continue opportunistic attacks, even if the volume of such operations remains low. Newly refurbished tanks may also be held in reserve for longer-term strategic use, whether in Ukraine or in a potential conflict with a NATO member.
Russia’s ability to pose a conventional threat to NATO may materialize sooner than expected. This threat would not depend entirely on reconstituting its tank fleet to full strength. Russia is already engaged in sabotage, reconnaissance, and other irregular activities targeting critical infrastructure and military assets across Europe, a pattern consistent with what ISW characterizes as Phase Zero—the preparatory phase of military operations designed to set informational and psychological conditions ahead of open conflict.
Recent activity supports the assessment that Russia has already entered Phase Zero and is laying groundwork for future escalations. European authorities have reported increased incidents involving unidentified drones operating in or near military airspace.
On October 10, the Czech General Staff stated that the Czech military has observed a rise in drone activity near key infrastructure, with a particular focus on military facilities. On October 9, German outlet Der Spiegel reported that an unidentified drone entered the security perimeter of the NATO air base in Geilenkirchen. The drone reportedly flew at low altitude across the base’s runway on the evening of October 8.
The base hosts airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, which are essential to NATO’s eastern flank surveillance. German authorities have not attributed the incident to a specific actor. However, ISW assessed that Russia has been increasing both overt and covert attacks on Europe and that the ongoing drone incursions are consistent with a broader pattern of Russian condition-setting behavior.
Russia is expanding its long-range strike and drone production capabilities as part of this broader effort. These capabilities represent an immediate threat to NATO, independent of tank production timelines or conventional force strength.
While building toward larger conventional force regeneration, Russia is actively shaping the operational environment through intelligence gathering, sabotage, and psychological pressure. The modernization of equipment and the parallel development of asymmetric capabilities form a two-pronged approach that enables Russia to project power while preparing for long-term contingencies.
Russia’s ongoing force generation efforts include building a strategic manpower reserve. According to ISW’s assessment, this reserve could be used either in Ukraine or deployed rapidly to NATO’s eastern flank following a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. This preparation implies that Russia does not require a complete restoration of its pre-2022 force structure before initiating new operations.
In fact, ISW has found no indication that Russian military leadership intends to delay offensive action against NATO until its forces are fully reconstituted. Instead, Russia appears willing to act before reaching pre-war end strength if it perceives that NATO deterrence remains insufficient.
Russia is also revising its operational concepts and tactics based on lessons learned in Ukraine. These include methods for executing large-scale military operations without deploying massed tank formations or achieving air superiority.
Russia is developing techniques to achieve the effects of battlefield air interdiction in enemy rear areas through missile strikes, drones, and electronic warfare, bypassing the need for direct control of airspace. This tactical evolution reflects adaptations to an attritional and innovation-heavy combat environment, where traditional dominance in armor and airpower has been challenged.
The current war in Ukraine has forced Russia to engage in high-casualty, infantry-led combat. At the same time, it has accelerated Russian experimentation with new methods of attack and battlefield adaptation.
According to ISW, Russia is gaining experience in a dynamic military theater characterized by rapid innovation cycles, drone warfare, and persistent pressure across multiple domains. These developments are expected to carry forward into any future conflict with NATO, where Russia could leverage this combat experience and revised doctrine.
Ukraine’s European partners continue to respond by expanding their support for Ukraine’s defense industrial base. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans on October 10 to discuss a memorandum of understanding between the two countries. The agreement includes the joint production of deep-strike drones, €110 million in funding for the Build with Ukraine initiative, and €200 million for Ukrainian air defense systems.
On October 11, Ukraine also signed agreements with the United Kingdom to jointly produce artillery and issued letters of intent to strengthen the LYRA program, a battlefield technology collaboration. These partnerships aim to enhance Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity while bolstering industrial cooperation with key NATO members.
Russia’s expanding tank production, refurbishment efforts, and broader military posture reflect a deliberate strategy to prepare for conflicts beyond the current war in Ukraine. The combination of stockpiling modern tanks, developing hybrid tactics, and conducting reconnaissance and influence operations in Europe supports the assessment that Russia is not merely sustaining a wartime economy but preparing for an extended confrontation.
The operational and industrial measures underway suggest that Russian military threats may intensify following any end to open hostilities in Ukraine, making future conflict planning by NATO and its allies a critical priority.
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Alexander Zemlianichenko (AP)
